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DD / S R E G I S T R Y

FILE *Security!*

29 MAR 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Security Alarm Installation and  
Maintenance

1. This memorandum, which you requested, is a status report on the progress of our electronic unit which will install and maintain security alarms in the greater Headquarters area.

2. As you are aware, we were recently given authorization to recruit five electronically qualified individuals to install and maintain all security alarms locally. To date three men have been brought aboard, and two more are in the pipe line and should report by mid-April.

25X1 3. We are now in the process of renovating the electronic lab in the [redacted] This should be completed by 10 April. The necessary equipment for the new men is on hand.

4. The new men are now undergoing in-house training. They have been provided a day of training by a representative of the Kidde Company, the manufacturer of most of our alarm equipment, and are beginning to work on a few systems outside the main Headquarters Building. They are being gradually phased into a greater percentage of the work, and we anticipate that they will take over completely by 1 June 1971.

25X1 5. Listed below for the last three fiscal years is money paid the [redacted] for security alarm maintenance. This contract will be terminated for FY-72.

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<u>Year</u>	<u>Budgeted</u>	<u>Spent</u>
FY-69	\$30,000	\$20,904
FY-70	\$30,000 - \$43,000*	\$43,981
FY-71	\$40,000	\$39,105**

\*Amended and raised to \$43,000

\*\*Projected through 31 May 1971 based on an expenditure of \$28,446 through 28 February 1971

6. As you know, \$20,000 of FY-71 funds was transferred to this Office from the Office of Logistics to pay for new security alarm installations in the Headquarters Building. To date, \$12,745.30 has been spent. The Office of Logistics has cooperated fully in attempting to hold down costs and in smoothing the transition from the old to the new method of security alarm installation and maintenance.

7. We look forward to the assumption of full responsibility for security alarms on 1 June 1971. We are confident that we will be able to do the job more cheaply than by contracting out the work and are sure that we can do it much better.

[Redacted Signature]

Howard J. Osborn  
Director of Security

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
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*Security 1*  
15 MAR 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Building Security Committee Report

1. In response to my memorandum of 5 February 1971 to him, the Director of Security today briefed me on the four items covered in that memorandum and on the badge machine.
2. As to the machine, it is obvious that a lot of work has been done and a fair amount of money spent, as yet unsuccessfully. Security is still working on the problem but it is quite evident that the combination of requirements makes solution very difficult. All the devices considered so far have failed on one or more counts. One of the most difficult ones is speed of response to avoid traffic jams during the rush hours through the various Building entrances. Not only would there be a loss of time on the job, but the employees themselves would seriously object to having to queue up and pass through a machine which required any appreciable time to process individuals. In this connection, the Office of Security has just received yet another device which they are going to install and test in one of the smaller buildings currently occupied by Agency components.
3. The subject of restricted areas is not a simple one and is compounded by certain specifications (laid down for gray line installation; intra-Agency political considerations, i.e., those senior officers who have restricted areas feel very strongly about retaining them; coded push button locks serve well for small areas but not large ones; and, as indicated above, machines to substitute for guards have not yet been found. Something may come of the present tests.
4. The safety program has been upgraded somewhat but it faces the same staff problem that practically everything else in the Agency does. The Director of Security has augmented the safety staff by the transfer of another professional position out of the balance of the Office of Security, and he has, since the report, taken on one contract professional safety inspector, one contract electrician, and one contract part-time statistician. He will provide a current status report on the safety program. This will include, among other things, the maintenance of alarm systems, which



apparently is a continuing problem. In passing he noted the importance of early consultation in the planning or procurement of buildings for Agency occupancy. While he recognizes that all too often Logistics is under great pressure by GSA to act when a move is contemplated, considerable benefit could be derived from the earliest possible inclusion of the Office of Security in the planning effort.

5. Technical checks of telephones must be limited only to sensitive areas as the staff who would perform these checks are the same people who run the overseas program. Simply a question of not being able to be in two places at once. I'm satisfied, however, that the Director of Security has thought through the telephone security problem and, with certain technical activities, his Office is reasonably well satisfied that technical telephone security is not a serious problem.

6. Pending the receipt of the report on the safety program, I'm inclined to think that a follow-up survey on building security could well be scheduled for the summer of 1972, i.e., on a three-year schedule, the current one having been reported in September of 1969.



Robert S. Wattles  
Assistant Deputy Director  
for Support

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ADD/S:RSW/ms (15 Mar 71)

Distribution:

Orig - DD/S Subject, w/Background (DD/S 71-0164)

1 - DD/S Chrono

1 - RSW Chrono

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DD/S 71-0164

5 FEB 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

*Security!*

Oz:

I'm entering this subject rather late in the game and with some apology, but I've just been getting up-to-date on the Building Security Committee Report. There are four recommendations on which it appears action is either lagging or not going forward at all. I'd like to list them and then suggest that, after you get yourself up-to-date, we get together to talk about them.

Those items are:

a. On page 52 of the Report: "Eliminate the use of Restricted Areas, currently the DDI All Source Area and the DDP FI/D Area, and employ Compartmented Areas in their place." I understand that some thinking has been addressed to this for the development of mechanical devices to replace the guards, which reminds me that the "badge machine" is still some kind of an open issue. It may be that the entire subject of guard and receptionist functions needs to be restudied.

b. On page 68: "Establish a viable Safety Program to remedy ineffectual aspects of the present Program (including, but not limited to: testing and maintenance of fire alarm systems, annual overall Building safety inspections, motor vehicle safety, ordnance movements, Building construction plan reviews, toxic vapors tests, promotional and educational projects)." I understand that a draft report was prepared but that last October you reported that further extensive studies were required. Are those studies going on? If not, maybe we ought to have some sort of interim action.

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downgrading and  
declassification

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c. On page 69: "Obtain five contract personnel -- two electricians to establish and maintain an in-house fire alarm testing program, two qualified professional Staff Safety Officers and one clerical statistician. The use of staff employees would be desirable but, due to personnel ceiling restrictions and present OS workloads, this cannot be accomplished. The use of GSA or other outside contractors not fully under Agency control would not be desirable due to the requirements for unsupervised after-hours work in sensitive areas." I have a draft report prepared in Logistics on the status of fire alarm systems in Agency-owned or occupied buildings. Apparently there are a good many deficiencies in the maintenance of those systems. Maybe you ought to get together with Blake on this before going any farther.

d. On page 85: "OS to prepare for early implementation a program for the checking of all telephone instruments in the Headquarters Building. OS to advise the DD/S orally or by memorandum not later than 15 October of proposed program of telephone checks." On page 86: "OS to identify - and program checks of - additional sensitive areas which might be considered possible or likely targets of technical penetration efforts." I suppose this is a manpower problem in Tech Division, which then suggests a weighing of the impact of the recommendations against other requirements with the possibility of reprogramming some of your manpower.

While I recognize that there has been no lessening of the demands on your Office and you are about to undergo, along with the rest of us, some further reductions in manpower, I think you will agree that these Committee recommendations were the thoughtful product of some competent professional thinking and we must not let the items die of inattention. If you would like to discuss this before undertaking any further action in your Office, let me know.

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SOS/DDS: [redacted] (14 Jan 71)  
Revised: PS-DD/S:SWR:bkf (1 Feb 71)  
Rewritten: ADD/S:RSW/ms (4 Feb 71)  
Distribution:

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1 - DD/S Chrono

1 - DD/S Subject w/Background ✓


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1 - SOS BSC File

1 - PS Chrono

*Robert S. Wattles*  
75/ Robert S. Wattles

Robert S. Wattles





2 February 1971

NOTE FOR: Mr. Wattles

I feel it is necessary to surface and face the lagging recommendations to resolve with action or conscious decision to not take action. I felt that Mr. [ ] should highlight these to Mr. Osborn by a meeting or an informal note to give him a chance to investigate before DD/S called them to his attention. Also OS has taken cuts and I think they would be touchy to be pushed too hard to do all that is recommended. [ ] rewrite is designed to include his budget interest re the money spent on badge machine research and he thinks it should be from DD/S.

I think you would be interested in the Building Security Report and the approach to resolve the recommendations.

I would recommend you sign the DD/S memo with a little personal note on a routing slip that you are aware of OS priorities and shrinking resources and would like to just talk about the matters mentioned with an objective of deciding what should or should not be done, how and when.

  
WEB

Note: Mr. [ ] has seen the rewrite, per WEB.

DD/S 71-0164

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Status of Action on the Building  
Security Committee Report

REFERENCE : Memo to C/BSC fr DD/S dtd 22 Sept 69;  
Subject: Report of the Building Security  
Committee, dtd 3 September 1969

1. Of the various recommendations made by the Building Security Committee on 9 September 1969, there are four on which action has lagged. You may wish to give them a push, discuss them to obtain a waiver or present for approval reasonable alternative solutions. The lagging recommendations are:

a. In the section of the report on Internal Physical Security (page 52), the Committee recommended: 'Eliminate the use of Restricted Areas, currently the DDI All Source Area and the DDP FI/D Area, and employ Compartmented Areas in their place. "

Comment:

(1) The report estimated that the savings of 16 receptionist and guard positions which would be realized from this recommendation could be annualized at \$228,000 after a first-year offset for purchase of security devices. Instead of converting the Restricted Areas to Compartmented Areas through the installation of Simplex Locks, people in your Office have been investigating the development of a device to take the place of the guards at most of the barriers and enable the Restricted Area concept to be retained. The device would allow access of an individual to be verified and controlled by a computer. Progress in obtaining and demonstrating this new device has lagged, but Mr. [ ] has indicated several times that

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his people are still hoping to obtain it. Rather than continuing to defer action on this recommendation, perhaps you might want to consider proceeding with the action requested by Mr. Bannerman in paragraph 2c of referent memorandum, pending development and acceptance of a more sophisticated system. If such a system involves a computer, of course, it will have to be thoroughly justified and submitted to the Executive Director-Comptroller for approval.

(2) It is noted that past activity toward the development of a "badge machine" has been totally unproductive, in spite of the expenditure of large sums of money by Security and DD/S&T. We also note considerable doubt that even a successful "badge machine" could be relied upon unless attended by guards -- which seems to eliminate all possibility of savings. Other agencies appear also to be unable to satisfy the requirement for an automated entry control device. The large numbers of guards and receptionists nonetheless offer an opportunity for needed savings wherever their services can be dispensed with. I suggest, therefore that the entire subject of guard and receptionist functions be restudied for possible alternative solutions including a review of:

(a) the results of the badge machine effort to date including funds expended, results obtained and reasons why the badge machine, as developed, was not used;

(b) the practicability of the use of badge machines supplemented by guards and receptionists, particularly during peak periods;

(c) the number and location of guard posts and the possibility of reduction through coupling with badge machines.

b. In the section on the Safety Program, the Committee recommended (page 68): "Establish a viable Safety Program to promptly meet each aspect of the present Program (including,

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but not limited to: testing and maintenance of fire alarm systems, annual overall Building safety inspections, motor vehicle safety, ordnance movements, Building construction plan reviews, toxic vapors tests, promotional and educational projects). "

Comment:

The Office of Security agreed to review the Safety Program in terms of the size of the Safety Staff and the functions already assigned to it. A draft report was prepared, but the Office of Security reported on 20 October 1970 that further extensive studies are required before a completed report can be submitted to the DD/S. You may want to consider submitting an interim report setting forth the facts of the situation, or discuss an approach or plan to resolve the problem.

c. The section on the Safety Program also recommended (page 69): "Obtain five contract personnel -- two electricians to establish and maintain an in-house fire alarm testing program, two qualified professional Staff Safety Officers and one clerical statistician. The use of staff employees would be desirable but, due to personnel ceiling restrictions and present OS workloads, this cannot be accomplished. The use of GSA or other outside contractors not fully under Agency control would not be desirable due to the requirements for unsupervised after-hours work in sensitive areas. "

Comment:

It is my understanding that action has not been assigned to implement this recommendation. There is attached a draft report prepared in the Office of Logistics on the status of fire alarm systems in both Agency-owned and Agency-occupied buildings in the Washington Metropolitan area. This report indicates numerous deficiencies in the maintenance of the fire alarm systems. You may wish to discuss with the Director of Logistics reassignment of responsibilities for maintaining the fire alarm systems to an outside contractor under the supervision of the Office of Logistics.

d. In that section of the report on agreed-upon actions having to do with Technical Security, the report provides (page 85): "OS to prepare for early implementation a program for the checking of all telephone instruments in the Headquarters Building. OS to advise the DD/S orally or by memorandum not later than 15 October of proposed program of telephone checks. " The report also states (page 86): "OS to identify - and program checks of - additional sensitive areas which might be considered possible or likely targets of technical penetration efforts. "

Comment:

Action to implement these recommendations has been suspended because of manpower limitations within the Technical Division. You may wish to consider, from the overall Office of Security point of view, whether or not the impact of these recommendations is of sufficient importance to warrant possible reprogramming of activities or manpower within the Office as a whole.

2. I would suggest that we get together for an informal briefing on these subjects rather than preparing staff papers.

John W. Coffey  
Deputy Director  
for Support

Attachments

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DD/S 71-0164

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Status of Action on the Building Security  
Committee Report

REFERENCE : Memo to C/BSC fr DD/S dtd 22 Sept 69, subject:  
Report of the Building Security Committee,  
dtd 3 Sept 69


1. Of the various recommendations made by the Building Security Committee on 9 September 1969, there are four on which action has lagged. You may wish to give them a push, discuss them with the DD/S to obtain a waiver or present for approval reasonable alternative solutions. The lagging recommendations are:

a. In the section of the report on Internal Physical Security (p. 52) the Committee recommended: "Eliminate the use of Restricted Areas, currently the DDI All Source Area and the DDP FI/D Area, and employ Compartmented Areas in their place."

Comment: The report estimated that the savings of 16 receptionist and guard positions which would be realized from this recommendation could be annualized at \$228,000 after a first-year offset for purchase of security devices. Instead of converting the Restricted Areas to Compartmented Areas through the installation of Simplex Locks, people in your Office have been investigating the development of a device to take the place of the guards at most of the barriers and enable the Restricted Area concept to be retained. The device would allow access of an individual to be verified and controlled by a computer. Progress in obtaining and demonstrating this new device has lagged but Mr. [ ] has indicated several times that his people are still hoping to obtain it. Rather than continuing to defer action

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on this recommendation, perhaps you might want to consider proceeding with the action requested by Mr. Bannerman in paragraph 2c of referent memorandum pending development and acceptance of a more sophisticated system. If such a system involves a computer, of course, it will have to be thoroughly justified and submitted to the Executive Director-Comptroller for approval.

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Comment: The Office of Security agreed to review the Safety Program in terms of the size of the Safety Staff and the functions already assigned to it. A draft report was prepared, but the Office of Security reported on 20 October 1970 that further extensive studies are required before a completed report can be submitted to the DD/S. You may want to consider submitting an interim report to the DD/S setting forth the facts of the situation, or discuss with him an approach or plan to resolve the problem.

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Comment: It is my understanding that action has not been assigned to implement this recommendation. There is attached a draft report prepared in the Office of Logistics on the status of fire alarm systems in both Agency-owned and Agency-occupied buildings in the Washington Metropolitan area. This report indicates numerous deficiencies in the maintenance of the fire alarm systems. You may wish to discuss with the Director of Logistics reassignment of responsibilities for maintaining the fire alarm systems to an outside contractor under the supervision of the Office of Logistics.

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Comment: Action to implement these recommendations has been suspended because of manpower limitations within the Technical Division. You may wish to consider from the overall Office of Security point of view whether or not the impact of these recommendations is of sufficient importance to warrant possible reprogramming of activities or manpower within the Office as a whole.

  
Chief, Support Operations Staff/DD/S

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Attachments

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14 January 1971

BUILDING SECURITY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS  
STATUS REPORT

<u>Subject/Actions</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Comments</u>
I. <u>Perimeter Controls</u>		
CCTV	Completed	25X1
<div></div>		
Program for use of video tape recorder	Completed	Recorder installed; guards instructed on its use. 25X1
<div></div>		
II. <u>Utilities</u>		
Modify air conditioning in trash disposal room	Completed 8/31/70	
Consider CCTV surveillance of disposal areas	Considered and rejected	On further study, area does not lend itself to TV. Further, TV here could result in morale problem.
Investigate feasibility of localized paper shredders	2500 lb/hr. shredder installed in OSA <div></div>	Evaluated; preliminary conclusions have been arrived at and recommendations will be made in the near future. 25X1
III. <u>Guard Force</u>		
Investigate use of badge machine	Agency machine now inoperative.	The present machine has proved unsatisfactory and no further use of it is contemplated.

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<u>Subject/Actions</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Review concentration of patrols on lower floors	Reviewed	No change in order due to possibilities of intrusion and fire risk. Small in-balance correctable by barrier removal or mechanical electronic controls.

IV. Technical Security

25X1



V. Personnel Access and Control

Spot checks of briefcases at COB	Cancelled	DD/S 69-5263, 21 Nov 69.
Prepare action to fingerprint all categories of personnel	In process. Arranged with GSA to receive print card on each GSA employee assigned to CIA buildings in D.C. area, upon initial employment and upon reinvestigation.	Matter of prints on contractor personnel - GSI, chars in buildings other than Hqs, etc., under continuing study and attention.

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<u>Subject/Actions</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Reschedule guard security inspections prior to char force access	In suspense	Proposed change from Restricted to Compartmented areas would free guards for earlier inspection.
VI. <u>Internal Physical Security</u>		
Issue periodic reminder notices re security violations	Cancelled	DD/S 69-4988, 4 Nov 69, requested memos to each DD regarding OS findings on penalties. Subsequently, DD/S made decision not to forward the memos.
Install grillwork at Hqs. main entrance	Completed	Accepted 7/9/70.
Change Restricted areas to Compartmented areas	In suspense	The Sargent Kesso key and computer identification system is being explored as an alternative to guards on the North end barrier area.
Program to maintain/replace ultrasonic alarm systems	Completed. DD/S 70-3923, 8 Sept 70. OS will do all Hqs. area installation and maintenance, replacing ultrasonic alarms where practicable.	OS program approved by DD/S 70-3997, 1 Oct 70 which authorized 5 contract positions for the effort.
VII. <u>Safety Program</u>		
Review safety program in terms of assigned functions vs. size of staff	Draft completed	Extensive study and revision required before submission to DD/S. 10/20/70 - No action being taken by OS.

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	<u>Subject/Actions</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Comments</u>
25X1	Revise safety program regulation [ ] simplify safety manual handbook	Revised reg with DDP for coordination. Chapters 1 to 4 of HB have been rewritten.	
25X1	[ ]		
	Explore contract maintenance of fire alarm	No firm action being taken.	No fixed responsibility for this action (see draft on fire alarm systems, att.).
	Study fire protection/detection system in Printing Services Building	In process. 9/22/70 GSA made site survey. Reps. from GSA, OS and OL met same day to discuss design criteria and establish zoning.	GSA prelim. report dtd 4/20/70 fwd OS/Safety 9/21/70. Report recommends sprinkler, no foam--and estimates \$85,000. Reps. from Region 3 Improvements Branch are recommending GSA fund the project.

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Draft

Fire-alarm Systems in Agency-owned and -occupied Buildings

Ames Building has two fire-alarm systems.

- a. One manual, owned and maintained by the building manager
- b. One automatic, owned by the Agency
  1. Two four-zone-notifier panels. These zones include special areas such as the fifth floor computer areas with smoke and heat detectors. Remote smoke detector control panels are installed within the computer areas. Some of these panels have to be disconnected until necessary maintenance is accomplished. Other floors have heat detectors disconnected due to lack of maintenance.


Magazine Building has two fire-alarm systems.

- a. One manual, owned by building manager
- b. One automatic, owned by Agency
  1. There is a lack of as-built schematic drawings for the automatic systems. Agency tests revealed failure of several heat detectors to operate.

Key Building has two fire-alarm systems.

- a. One manual, owned by building manager
- b. One automatic, owned by Agency
  1. The automatic system has only one zone; two heat detectors are in the Finance vault. They failed to operate during the testing period. There is a lack of as-built schematic drawings and system maintenance.

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South Building has two fire-alarm systems.

- a. One manual, owned by Agency and maintained by GSA
- b. One automatic, owned by Agency and maintained by GSA
  1. The only discrepancy noted with the fire-alarm was a disconnected sprinkler water flow indicator for the basement chemical storage room. The CO<sub>2</sub> system in the attic area is pending removal. Several heat detectors failed during an Agency test. Modifications to internal wiring of new basement control panel is to be accomplished.

East Building has two fire-alarm systems

- a. One manual, owned by Agency and maintained by GSA
  1. All fire bells on manual system failed to sound when activated during the last fire drill conducted by the Agency.
- b. One automatic, owned by Agency and maintained by GSA
  2. The automatic heat detectors in basement area failed during testing. There are no schematic drawings and there is much need for maintenance.

Central Building has two fire-alarm systems

- a. One manual, owned by Agency and maintained by GSA
- b. One automatic, owned by Agency and maintained by GSA
  1. CO<sub>2</sub> systems on the second floor need maintenance. Tanks in the attic need testing and weighing, and all circuits need tracing and testing. False alarms in building need to be isolated and repaired especially in the attic area. South , East, and Central buildings should ring to one control point (South Building).

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Headquarters Building has two fire-alarm systems

- a. One manual
- b. One automatic
  1. Automatic system awaiting complete rewiring of smoke detection to separate panel in the guard office. Needs sprinkler system in trash areas. The internal circuitry of the main control panel should be required so that the evacuation bells in the basement and penthouse ring simultaneously with the remainder of the building.

PSD Building

- a. Installation of an entire sprinkler system by GSA. is pending.

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